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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court's consideration. 
Article I, § 8 of the Idaho Constitution allows for felony prosecutions to begin only upon 
either the filing of lnformation of the prosecutor or lndictment of a grand jury; however, if 
a grand jury has "ignored" a charge, a defendant may not be held to answer upon an 
lnformation of the prosecutor. The record in this case indicates that the State filed a 
criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime of sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen and, after a preliminary hearing, an lnformation was filed charging 
Mr. Pierce with this crime. Mr. Pierce pled guilty and, during the sentencing hearing, the 
prosecutor stated that a grand jury proceeding had been held in this case. Mr. Pierce, 
through motions filed with this Court during the appellate process, sought additional 
evidence of the grand jury proceedings in this case and whether the grand jury ignored 
the charge. The record now shows that three grand jury proceedings occurred during 
the approximate time period that Mr. Pierce's case would have been presented, but this 
Court has denied Mr. Pierce the ability to discover whether any of those proceedings 
involved his case. 
Based upon the admission of the prosecutor that a grand jury reviewed 
Mr. Pierce's case, an admission that has not been disproved by the record, and based 
upon the fact that no lndictment was issued, Mr. Pierce asserts that his right to be free 
from prosecution upon lnformation of the prosecutor, after a grand jury ignored the 
charge, was violated. He further asserts, as an issue of first impression, that the plain 
language of Article I, $j 8 in effect limits when a court has subject-matter jurisdiction and 
that a violation of this Constitutional provision can be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, Mr. Pierce's conviction must be vacated. 
Alternatively, Mr. Pierce asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
his probation or by failing to reduce his sentence, upon his admission to probation 
violations 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas -Trial Court 
Based upon an allegation that on March 6, 2006, he had pulled down the 
underwear of a four-year-old girl, Louis Pierce was arrested. (Presentence Investigation 
Report, (hereinafter PSI), 9/14/06, p.2.) The next day, the State filed a Complaint in 
Ada County case number M0603051 alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime 
of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, by having "sexual contact" 
with four year old M.B. by pulling down her underwear, so that he could see her 
genitals. (Augment: Complaint (M06003051).)' Mr. Pierce was arraigned on the 
charges and a preliminary hearing was set. (Augment: Ada County Magistrate Minutes, 
March 7, 2006 (M06003051).) However, on March 20, 2006, the date set for hearing, 
the prosecuting attorney, Jean Fisher, moved to dismiss the allegation - a motion 
granted by the magistrate. (Augment: Ada County Magistrate Minutes, March 20, 2006; 
Order of Release (M06003051).) 
' Mr. Pierce has filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Augment the Record 
and Statement in Support Thereof asking this Court to reconsider the portion of a 
previous ruling in which this Court denied Mr. Pierce's request to augment the record 
t..;rh A,,m~rnnn+c frnm A d s  h81ntw race nt~mher M0603051. The motion to reconsider is 
The next day, the State filed a Complaint in Ada County case number M0603728, 
again alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor on 
March 6, 2006, naming M. B. as the alleged victim. (R., pp.7-8.) The charging 
language contained in this Complaint is nearly identical to the language contained the 
Complaint filed in M0603051 with the exception that the second Complaint contains an 
added allegation that Mr. Pierce was over the age of eighteen when the alleged crime 
occurred. (Compare Augment: Complaint (M0603051) with R., pp.7-8.) Shelley 
Armstrong represented the prosecuting attorney's office during the Preliminary Hearing 
in this case. (Exhibit: Tr., prelim.) The only exhibit offered during the preliminary 
hearing was a written statement created by Mr. Pierce on the night of his arrest. 
(Exhibit: Tr., prelim, p.13, L.11 - p.15, L.15.) Mr. Pierce was bound over to the district 
court, and an Information was filed charging him with the above crime. (R., pp.13-21; 
Exhibit: Tr., prelim.) 
Mr. Pierce, without the benefit of a plea bargain, pled guilty as charged. (Tr., 
8/1/06, p.1, L . l  - p.16, L.21.) Again, Ms. Armstrong represented the prosecuting 
attorney's office during the entry of plea hearing. (R., p.41; Tr., 8/1/06, p.?, L.l - p.16, 
L.21.) On October 25, 2006, a sentencing hearing was held wherein Jean Fisher 
represented the State. (R., pp.47-50; Tr., 10125106, p.17, L . l  - p.48, L.20.) The district 
court began the sentencing hearing by identifying the case, the parties, the purpose of 
the hearing, and identified the materials to be included with the PSI. (Tr., 10/25/06, 
p. 17, L. 1 - p. 18, L. 16.) The Court asked Ms. Fisher if she had adequate time to review 
the materials and Ms. Fisher responded by stating, "I have, Your Honor. And what was 
not included in those that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two photographs of the 
children in question. I would like to include those for purposes of the pre-sentence 
investigation. These were shown to the grand jury as well." (Tr., 10125/06, p.18, 
Ls.14-23 (emphasis added).) 
Ultimately, the district court sentenced Mr. Pierce to a unified term of fifteen 
years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction in order for Mr. Pierce to participate 
in the rider program. (R., pp.51-54.) Mr. Pierce successfully completed his rider and 
was placed on probation for a period of fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.) About seven 
months later, the State filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.78-81.) Mr. Pierce 
admitted to violating his probation by failing to pay his supervision fees, failing to 
complete sex offender treatment and by frequenting places where minors or victims of 
choice congregate. (Tr., 12/13/07, p.10, L.21 - p.1 I, L.20.) The district court revoked 
Mr. Pierce's probation and executed his underlying sentence. ( R  pp.89-91.) 
Mr. Pierce filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Order of Revocation of Probation, 
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment. (R., pp.92-94.) 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinss -Appellate Court 
Mr. Pierce filed a motion with this Court asking the Court to augment the record 
with any transcript of grand jury proceedings, if they exist, concerning the allegation that 
Mr. Pierce sexually abused M.B. on March 6, 2006, which would likely have been held 
sometime between March 7 and March 20, 2006. (See Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Revelation of Grand Jury Determination and 
Statement in Support Thereof, filed October 14, 2006.) In the same motion, Mr. Pierce 
requested that this Court augment the record with any document, if one exists, 
'..$:--':-- 
-.-..A i s a m ,  rinrlinad tn i v a ~ ~  an Indictment aaainst Mr. Pierce for his 
alleged abuse of M.B. on March 6, 2006. Id. Alternatively, Mr. Pierce requested that if 
no grand jury proceedings occurred, that this Court order the district court to enter a 
written statement indicating such. Id. 
In response, this Court entered an Order requiring that "the District Court Clerk 
shall SEARCH THEIR RECORDS AND REPORT WHETHER ANY GRAND JURY 
PROCEEDING WAS INITIATED as to Defendant Luis James Pierce and report 
existence or non-existenceof the same" to the parties and the Court. (See Order Re: 
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury 
Determination, dated December 8, 2008.) In response to this Court's order the district 
court filed, with this Court a written statement indicating the following: 
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any records regarding 
grand jury proceedings involving the Defendant-Appellant nor any 
information that such proceedings took place. The staff's search 
indicated that records of three grand jury proceedings (Nos. 22, 23 
and 24), which may have taken place during the approximate time 
frame, were not received by the clerk's office. The clerk's staff was 
unable to find any grand jury minutes, voting records, or other documents 
showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment against the 
Defendant-Appellant. 
(See Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination, dated 
December 12,2008 (emphasis added)) 
Thereafter, Mr. Pierce filed a second motion to augment in essence requesting 
three things. (See Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And For 
In Camera Review Of Grand Jury Proceedings And Statement And Affidavit In Support 
Thereof, filed January 16, 2009.) First, Mr. Pierce requested that this Court augment 
the record with documents filed in Ada County case number M0603051, the docket 
number wherein the prosecutor originally filed, then dismissed the allegation of sexual 
abuse against Mr. Pierce, and included copies of the documents with the motion. Id. 
Second, Mr. Pierce requested that this Court order the creation of a transcript of the 
March 20, 2006, scheduled preliminary hearing in Mr. Pierce's case wherein the court 
minutes reflect the State dismissed the charge, but the minutes did not indicate a 
reason for the dismissal or whether it was with prejudice. Id. 
The third request Mr. Pierce made was that this Court order the Honorable 
Darla S. Williamson, Administrative Judge for the Ada County District Court, or her 
designee, to conduct an in camera review of all of the recordings occurring in grand jury 
proceedings Nos. 22, 23, 24, as indicated in the clerk's response to this Court's Order 
requiring the district court to review its file to see if any grand jury proceedings occurred 
in Mr. Pierce's case and to inform the parties to this appeal whether such a proceeding 
had occurred. Id. Mr. Pierce alternatively requested that if it was impossible for Judge 
Williamson to review these proceedings that she provide a written statement indicating 
the reason. Id. This alternative request was made because, as is indicated in the 
affidavit of counsel attached to the motion, two district court personnel had stated, 
respectively, that when a grand jury does not issue an indictment, no records are kept 
by the district court, and that the Ada County prosecutor handling the proceedings 
deletes the recordings of the proceedings.' Id. In response, the Court issued an order 
simply denying Mr. Pierce's motion without providing any reason for doing so. (See 
' Mr. Pierce understands that counsel's affidavit attached to the Motion to Augment and 
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and for In Camera Review of Grand Jury Proceedings 
and Statement and Affidavit in Support Thereof, is not evidence on this appeal. 
I I-...-..-- +h;- ;nfnrm=tinn i= rnIn\,nnt tn consider the auestion of whether or not 
Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Reset the Briefing Schedule, dated 
February 17,2009.)~ This Appellant's Brief follows. 
ISSUES 
1 Has Mr. Pierce's right to be free from trial by Information after a grand jury has 
ignored a charge, protected by Article I 3 8 of the Idaho Constitution, been 
violated requiring that his conviction be vacated as the district court did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crime? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion after Mr. Pierce admitted to violating his 
probation by executing his original sentence under the facts and circumstances 
of this case? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mr. Pierce's Right To Be Free From Trial Bv lnformation After A Grand Juw Has 
lanored A Charae, Protected By Article I 5 8 Of The ldaho Constitution, Has Been 
Violated Requirinq That His Conviction Be Vacated As The District Court Did Not Have 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over The Alleaed Crime 
A. Introduction 
Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution clearly and unequivocally states that if a 
grand jury ignores a charge against a person, that person cannot be thereafter charged 
for the same offense by lnformation. While no ldaho Court has so held, the clear and 
unequivocal language of this Constitutional provision denies a court subject-matter 
jurisdiction, normally conferred through a properly filed lnformation, when that 
lnformation is filed upon a charge previously ignored by a grand jury. Based upon the 
State's admission that a grand jury heard Mr. Pierce's case, and based upon the fact 
that the grand jury did not Indict Mr. Pierce, he asserts that the lnformation filed by the 
State did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the Court and as such, his conviction 
stemming from that lnformation must be vacated. 
6. Article I, 5 8 Of The ldaho Constitution Both Grants And Limits A District Court's 
Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction. A Court Has No Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Over A 
Case Where An lnformation Is Filed In Violation Of This Provision And The Issue 
Can Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal 
As will be argued more fully in section I(C) below, Mr. Pierce asserts that the 
record in this case reveals that a grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge 
against him despite the fact that there is no official document in the record indicating as 
such. In order to determine the relevance of this factual determination, this Court must 
first decide an issue of first impression -whether an lnformation filed after a grand jury 
has ignored a charge, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution, is a legal 
nullity and, thus, fails to confer subject-matter jurisdiction to a court. Mr. Pierce asserts 
that an lnformation filed in such a manner is a legal nullity, the district court had no 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his case, and the issue can be raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
1. The Riahts Enumerated In Article I, 6 8 Are Both Individual Rights And A 
Limitation On State Power 
The right to be free from prosecution other than by Indictment of lnformation 
enumerated in Article I, § 8 is not merely a limit on the State's power to prosecute - it is 
also a right held by individuals. Article I of the ldaho Constitution is entitled "Declaration 
of Rights." IDAHO CONST. art. I. Generally, the subsections of this article enumerate 
rights retained by individuals against State power. Article I, § ? states that "All men are 
by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying 
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing 
happiness and securing safety." IDAHO CONST. art. I, 3 1. The ideals articulated in this 
section echo ideals articulated during the founding of this nation. 
Article I, 3 8 reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any 
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on 
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate 
... and provided further, that after a charge has been ignored by a grand 
jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon 
information of the public prosecutor. 
IDAHO C NST. art. I, § 8. By its plain language, this section reserves the right of 
:-A:..:A..-I- +, h- hair4 tn inc \hrmr  fnr felnnv offenses - offenses which if proven would 
allow the State to deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty and property - only 
after a grand jury has issued an indictment (or presentment), or after a prosecutor has 
filed an information upon a magistrate's commitment. Id. In other words, individuals 
cannot be held to answer for a felony offense unless a grand jury has issued an 
indictment or a prosecutor has filed an information. Id 
This individual right to be free from prosecution except by lnformation, is 
extended beyond the sole requirement of a commitment by a magistrate in situations 
where a grand jury has ignored a charge. Id. In such a case, an individual may not be 
held upon lnformation at all. Id. As a corollary, a prosecutor may not prosecute an 
individual on an lnformation after a grand jury has ignored the charge. In other words, 
individuals cannot be held to answer for a felony offense alleged in an lnformation 
unless no prior grand jury has reviewed and ignored the charge. 
2. An lndictment Or lnformation Confers Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction To The 
District Court 
A criminal proceeding cannot be held against a defendant in a trial court unless 
that court has both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant. State v. 
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227-28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 (2004). A trial court attains 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant - meaning the court's ability to hold the particular 
defendant to answer - when that defendant initially appears in court on a criminal 
complaint or an arraignment after an Indictment as been issued. Id. (citations omitted.) 
Subject-matter jurisdiction describes a court's power to hear and determine a 
particular case. Id. (citations omitted). In a felony criminal context, the trial court's 
subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred to the district court through the charging 
document, i.e., an lndictment or lnformation. Id. (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Jones, 140 ldaho 755, I 01  P.3d 699 (2004); State v. Quintero, 141 ldaho 619, 115 P.3d 
710 (2005). Absent a properly filed lndictment or lnformation, a district court does not 
have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 
3. Althouqh An lndictment Or lnformation May Be Filed, A Court's Subiect- 
Matter Jurisdiction. Ostensiblv Conferred Bv The Filing Of The Document, 
Mav Be Illusory 
ldaho Criminal Rule 7 articulates the requirements of Indictments and 
Informations. I.C.R. 7. Occasionally, an lndictment or lnformation will contain defects. 
However, not all defects that may be contained in these charging documents deprive a 
district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. ldaho Criminal Rule 12(b) requires that 
challenges to defects in the charging document, "other than it fails to show jurisdiction of 
the court or to charge an offense," must be raised prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b). Although a 
document may be filed which is entitled "lndictment" or "lnformation," it may not actually 
confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the district court. 
a. Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Can Never Be Waived And An Appellate 
Court Can Review Whether A Charqinq Document Properly 
Conferred Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction For The First Time On 
Appeal 
The ldaho Supreme Court recognizes that while personal jurisdiction may be 
either waived or submitted to by an individual's voluntary appearance in court, subject- 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Rogers, 140 ldaho at 227-28, 91 P.3d at 1127-28 
(citations omitted). As such, even if a defendant in a criminal case does not challenge 
the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction in the district court, an appellate court 
nevertheless may determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists when the 
question is raised for the first time on appeal. Id. 
b. Althourlh An Information Contains A Statement Of Territorial 
Jurisdiction And The Applicable Code Section Is Cited, An 
lnformation Filed After A Grand Juw Ignores A Charge Does Not 
Confer Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Upon A Court 
In recent years, the ldaho Supreme Court has addressed challenges to the 
charging document raised for the first time on appeal. In Jones, the ldaho Supreme 
Court recognized that two challenges to a charging instrument can be raised: first, 
whether the charging instrument complies with due process requirements, a challenge 
that must be made during trial court proceedings; and, second, "whether an indictment 
or information is legally sufficient for the purpose of imparting jurisdiction." Jones, 140 
ldaho at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. In Quintero, decided the following year, the Court held 
that when a charging document is challenged after the entry of judgment, the charging 
document will be deemed to have conferred subject-matter jurisdiction upon the court 
as long as it contains a statement of territorial jurisdiction and contains citation to the 
applicable code section. State v. Quinfero, 141 ldaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 
(2005) (citing Jones, 140 ldaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703; I.C.R. 12(b). However, both 
Jones and Quinfero dealt with a challenge to the sufficiency of the charging instrument 
where the charging instrument omitted elements of the crime charged. See State v. 
Quintero, 141 ldaho 619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005), generally; see also State v. Jones, 140 
ldaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004), generally. Mr. Pierce is unaware of any case wherein 
an ldaho Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, has held that filing an Information after 
a grand jury has ignored the charge, in violation of Article I, § 8, also deprives a court of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the plain reading of the constitutional provision as 
well as other precedent from ldaho leads inevitably to the conclusion that such a 
violation does deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
As noted above, Article I, § 8 reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any 
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on 
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate 
... and provided further, that after a charge has been ignored by a 
grand jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, 
upon information of the public prosecutor. 
ldaho Const. Art. I, 3 8 (emphasis added). The language is plain, concise, and 
unambiguous. "No" means "no" and, because the Indictment or lnformation confers 
subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Court, an lnformation filed in violation of Article I, 
§ 8's prohibition against filing an lnformation after a grand jury has ignored a charge, is 
a nullity. 
In Ex Parfe Winn, 28 ldaho 461, 154 P. 497,498 (1916), the petitioner filed a writ 
of habeas corpus arguing that Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution prevented the 
petitioner from being tried upon an lnformation filed in that case when a grand jury had 
ignored the charge. Id. However, in that case, the grand jury met affer the defendant 
was charged by lnformation with the crime. Id. The Court noted, "A fatal defect in this 
contention arises from the fact that, conceding the grand jury did ignore the charge, 
petitioner had been theretofore, instead of thereafter, held to answer and for trial." Id. 
Because the defendant had waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was held to 
answer in the district court, "the court acquired jurisdiction of petitioner and of the 
offense with which he was charged from which it could not be deprived by any action of 
- -----I :..-. ---.,---A ,+ ot#hcnn~tont torm " Id While the Court did not address what 
its ruling would have been had the grand jury ignored the charge "theretofore" the 
lnformation was filed, the Court recognized that jurisdiction was properly conferred to 
the district court because the lnformation was not improperly filed. 
In State v. Wilson, 41 ldaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925), the defendant appealed the 
district court's denial of his motion to quash and the exclusion of testimony from the 
prosecutor and the foreman of the grand jury, which he asserted would have shown that 
he was "acquitted" of the charge he was facing when the grand jury ignored the charge. 
Id. 41 ldaho at -, 242 P.2d at 787-88. The ldaho Supreme Court held that the denial 
of the defendant's motion to quash was not incorporated into a special bill of exceptions 
and thus was not properly before the Court. Id. The Court then held that his special 
plea, a statement that he had been "acquitted" of the charge after the grand jury ignored 
the charge, was not properly made and, even if this were not so, the district court did 
not err in excluding the proffered testimony because the failure of a grand jury to indict 
was not an "acquittal" under a double jeopardy analysis. Id. 
During the trial the appellant called the former prosecuting attorney and foreman 
of the grand jury, they were not allowed to testify, and the appellant made an offer of 
proof that, if allowed, they would testify that the grand jury previously ignored the charge 
against him. Id. 41 ldaho at -, 242 P. at 789. The Court recognized that "Counsel 
vigorously contends, however, that his offer raised a jurisdictional question of the 
highest order." Id. However, the Court found that the evidence proffered was intended 
to support a finding that his prosecution should be barred by operation of Article I, f3 8, a 
determination beyond the province of the jury. Id. 
Chief Justice Lee authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.4 
Id. 141 Idaho at -, 242 P. at 790-92 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.) Chief 
Justice Lee dissented because he believed that the "record on this appeal presents this 
jurisdictional question and this court should decide it." Id. 41 ldaho a t ,  242 P. at 
790 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.) Chief Justice Lee cited to Article I, 5 8 of the 
ldaho Constitution and continued: 
There can be no question but what this constitutional provision intends to 
bar and absolutely prohibit the public prosecutor from prosecuting one 
accused of crime after the charge has been ignored by a grand jury. With 
the wisdom of this organic act we are not concerned. 
Id. Chief Justice Lee found, "If an information could not be filed, the alleged information 
presented no question to the trial court that called its powers into action, except to 
require it to deny jurisdiction and dismiss the proceedings." Id. 41 Idaho at -, 242 P. 
at 791 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.). He concluded: 
In the case at bar, the defendant was tried upon an information that is a 
nullity, because neither the public prosecutor or any one else had the 
power to make the charge, and hence no charge was made, and the 
verdict of guilty and the judgment of conviction thereon are void. 
Id. 41 Idaho a t ,  242 P. at 792 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.) 
Thus, while ldaho Court's have yet to specifically rule that an Information filed 
after a grand jury has ignored a charge is a nullity and does not confer subject-matter 
jurisdiction to the Court, the plain reading of the Constitutional provision and the 
authorities cited above should lead this Court to hold as such 
Due to the death of Chief Justice Dunn prior to the case being fully briefed and 
d--id-d lltftirn I PP a~~thnred both a aortion of the majority opinion and a separate 
4. Because Mr. Pierce Claims That The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction To Hear His Case Based Upon The lnformation Filed After 
The Grand Jury lqnored His Case. His Claim Is Ripe For Appellate Review 
As noted above, a question of subject matter can be reviewed for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004). Mr. Pierce asserts that 
the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Information being 
filed after the grand jury ignored the charge against him. As such, his claim is ripe for 
appellate review. 
C. A Grand Jury lqnored The Charge Aaainst Mr. Pierce 
No document exists in the record unquestionably showing that a grand jury heard 
and ignored the charged against Mr. Pierce. Mr. Pierce recognizes that "jilt is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 ldaho 29, 34,981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 
1999) (citation omitted). Thus, he anticipates the State may argue that he has not 
supported his claim that a grand jury ignored the charge against him. However, based 
upon the State's unequivocal statement made in the district court that a grand jury was 
shown pictures of the alleged victim and her sister, the fact that an lnformation was 
eventually filed after the original complaint had been dismissed, the fact that three grand 
jury proceedings occurred during the possible time-frame a grand jury would have heard 
his case for which nothing was submitted to the district court, and the fact that there is 
no criminal rule articulating a procedure when a grand jury ignores a charge, Mr. Pierce 
asserts that the record in his case shows that a grand jury did in fact hear and ignore 
the charge. 
1. The State Admitted That A Grand Jury Reviewed The Case 
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated, "what was not included in 
[the presentence materials] that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two photographs of the 
children in question. I would like to include those for purposes of the pre-sentence 
investigation. These were shown to the grand jury as well." (Tr., 10/25/06, p.18, 
Ls.17-23 (emphasis added).) This statement is clear and unambiguous. There was no 
equivocal language such as "I believe" or "it is my understanding." The prosecutor 
acknowledged that a grand jury was convened. 
The photos in question were not presented to the magistrate during the 
preliminary hearing. The only exhibit offered during the preliminary hearing was a 
written statement created by Mr. Pierce on the night of his arrest. (Exhibit: Tr., prelim, 
p.13, L.11 - p.15, L.15.) It strains reason to conclude that the prosecutor simply meant 
to say "to the magistrate" or "during the preliminary hearing" rather than "to the grand 
jury" when the two photos were, in fact, not presented during to the magistrate during 
the preliminary hearing. While the prosecutor making a simple mistake cannot be ruled 
out, to believe such is to believe that the prosecutor was unaware that the hearing 
from which the charging document stemmed was secret and in front of sixteen citizens, 
outside the presence of the defendant, rather than open to the public, in front of one 
judge, in the presence of Mr. Pierce and his counsel, and that the prosecutor was 
merely mistaken in her belief that the photos were presented to whatever body was 
asked to determine if probable cause existed sufficient to formally charge the defendant. 
Furthermore, the very relevance that the prosecutor offered to support her 
request to show the photos to the district court and to be included in the PSI materials, 
was that they were previously viewed by a probable cause finder. There is no reason to 
believe that the prosecutor would intentionally mislead the district court in order to 
convince the court to place the photos with the presentence materials. The most logical 
conclusion is that the prosecutor made the statements because, in fact, the photos were 
presented to the grand jury. 
2. Three Grand Juw Proceedings May Have Occurred Durina The 
Approximate Time Frame That A Grand Jury Would Have Heard 
Mr. Pierce's Case And No Criminal Rule Directs A Grand Jury On What 
To Do When it Ignores A Charae 
In response to an Order from this Court, the district court filed a written statement 
indicating the following: 
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any records regarding 
grand jury proceedings involving the Defendant-Appellant nor any 
information that such proceedings took place. The staff's search 
indicated that records of three grand jury proceedings (Nos. 22, 23 
and 24), which may have taken place during the approximate time 
frame, were not received by the clerk's office. The clerk's staff was 
unable to find any grand jury minutes, voting records, or other documents 
showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment against the 
Defendant-Appellant. 
(See Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination, dated 
December 12, 2008) (emphasis added). The most obvious question is how could there 
have been grand jury proceedings in March of 2006, and the district court have no 
record of those proceedings in December of 2008? While the record in this case does 
not reveal a definitive reason why,5 the lack of a criminal rule stating exactly how such 
records are to be kept may provide an answer. 
ldaho Criminal Rules 6.1 through 6.9 govern the procedures attendant to the 
grand jury process. Rule 6.4 enumerates the secrecy involved in grand jury 
proceedings. I.C.R. 6.4. The only people allowed to be present are the grand jurors, 
the prosecuting attorney, a witness present for questioning, the person designated to 
report the proceedings, and any needed interpreters. I.C.R. 6.4(a). The district court 
judge is only allowed to be present, after the grand jury has been empanelled, if 
requested by the grand jury. Id. These proceedings, while secret, are supposed to be 
recorded either stenographically or electronically. I.C.R. 6.3(a). The recordings of the 
proceedings are supposed to be sealed by the clerk of the court and are only available 
for review, by order of the district court, by the prosecutor, the defendant or his counsel, 
or a person charged with perjury stemming from his testimony in front of the grand jury. 
I.C.R. 6.3(b)-(c). 
In Mr. Pierce's Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And For In 
Camera Review Of Grand Jury Proceedings And Statement And Affidavit In Support 
Thereof, filed January 16, 2009, undersigned counsel included his own affidavit 
acknowledging that he had spoken with two Ada County deputy clerks who informed 
him, respectively, that it was their understanding that any time a grand jury is 
empanelled and fails to indict, the prosecutor does not file any documentation indicating 
as such with the district court and destroys the audio recordings of the proceedings. If 
this is true, it is truly disturbing. Arguably a prosecutor who engages such behavior is 
withholding or destroying evidence that may be both exculpatory, mitigating and 
potentially impeaching. See Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Furthermore, 
such behavior would enable a prosecutor to violate a defendant's Article I, § 8 rights in 
the hope that a defendant would never find out - a violation difficult to discover due to 
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in general. Such behavior would be frowned 
upon by the ldaho Rules of Professional Conduct and would be repugnant to the basic 
ideal at the very foundation of this Nation that a person may not have their life, liberty, or 
. . 
When 12 grand jurors find probable cause sufficient to issue an indictment, the 
presiding grand juror must return the indictment to the district court. I.C.R. 6.6(c). 
Furthermore, the presiding grand jury is required to prepare a list of all jurors voting in 
favor of, and against, an indictment, a list that must be sealed but can be disclosed to 
the prosecutor, defendant and defense counsel, by order of the court. I.C.R. 6.6(d). 
This later rule appears to apply only when a grand jury has issued an indictment as, 
absent an indictment, there would likely be no defendant and no defense counsel. 
Furthermore, Rule 6.7(b) allows a defendant who has been indicted to challenge 
individual jurors provided that, if twelve or more qualified grand jurors concurred in 
finding an indictment, dismissal of the indictment is not warranted. I.C.R. 6.7(b). Thus, 
the voting list required under I.C.R. 6.6(d) appears to serve the purpose of a challenge 
under Rule 6.7(b). 
In any event, there is no criminal rule that specifically states what a grand jury is 
to do when they "ignore" a charge. Idaho Code § 19-1402 states that if a grand jury 
fails to indict a defendant, "the depositions, if any, transmitted to them must be returned 
to the court, with an indorsement thereon, signed by the foreman, to the effect that the 
charge is dismissed." I.C. § 19-1402. While this requirement states what procedure 
should be used when a grand jury fails to indict, there is no criminal rule that gives effect 
to this statute. Without a criminal rule giving effect to § 19-1402, and without any other 
document informing the grand jury, and prosecutors, what to do when a grand jury 
ignores a charge, the absence of evidence documenting that the grand jury ignore the 
charge, is not evidence of absence. 
In sum, the prosecutor stated that the grand jury reviewed Mr. Pierce's case. No 
grand jury Indictment was filed. Three grand jury proceedings may have occurred 
during the time period in which Mr. Pierce's case would have been pending, but there 
are no records as to what those grand jury proceedings dealt with. The absence of 
documentation showing that the grand jury ignored the charge is not dispositive of 
whether the grand jury heard the case based upon the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings, the role of gatekeeper employed by the prosecutor, and the lack of a 
criminal rule instructing the grand jury on what to do when it ignores a charge, 
Mr. Pierce asserts that the record in this case leads inextricably to the conclusion that a 
grand jury was empanelled, heard the allegations against him, and ignored the charge. 
D. Because The Grand Jury lanored The Charae Aaainst Mr. Pierce, The District 
Court Had No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction To Hear His Case And His Conviction 
Must Be Vacated 
Because a grand jury ignored the charge against him, the Information filed by the 
prosecutor was a legal nullity due to the clear and unequivocal requirements of Article I, 
§ 8 of the Idaho Constitution, and the district court did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Mr. Pierce's case. As such, this Court must vacate his conviction. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion After Mr. Pierce Admitted To Violating His 
Probation Bv Executing His Oriainal Sentence Under The Facts And Circumstances Of 
This Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Pierce asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion by executing the original sentence upon Mr. Pierce admitting to violating the 
terms of his probation. He asserts that his unified sentence of fifteen years, with five 
years fixed, is excessive considering the nature of his criminal act and his actions since 
that time. The district court abused its discretion by failing to continue Mr. Pierce on 
probation, failing to grant Mr. Pierce an opportunity at a second rider, or failing to reduce 
his sentence. 
8. The District Court Abused Its Discretion After Mr. Pierce Admitted To Violating 
His Probation BV Executing His Original Sentence Under The Facts And 
Circumstances Of This Case 
In proceedings stemming from alleged probation violations, the district court must. 
decide three issues: whether a condition of probation was violated; if so, whether 
probation should be revoked or continued; and, if probation is revoked, what prison 
sentence should be ordered. State v. Adams, 115 ldaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 
261 (Ct. App. 1989). In the present case, Mr. Pierce does not challenge the finding that 
he violated the terms of his probation as he admitted that he had done so. When an 
appellate Court reviews a sentence ordered into execution after probation has been 
revoked, the Court reviews the entire record including events before and after the 
original judgment was entered. Id. at 1055, 772 P.2d at 262. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court executed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 
(Ct. App. 1982). The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wlhere a sentence is within 
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979)). In order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Pierce must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing Sfafe v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The 
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). 
The district court had four options available to it during the disposition hearing: 
the court could have retained Mr. Pierce on probation applying some form of alternate 
sanction; pursuant to ldaho Code § 19-2601(4), the court could have retained 
jurisdiction for a second time over Mr. Pierce; pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 35, the 
district court could have executed a reduced sentence; or, the court could have 
executed the original sentence. Viewing all of the facts and circumstances in this case, 
the district court abused its discretion by executing the original sentence and not 
exercising one of the three lesser alternatives. 
Initially, it should be recognized that the nature of Mr. Pierce's offense, while 
certainly criminal and deserving of punishment, was not severe. Mr. Pierce was a 
neighbor of the four-year-old girl and her five-year-old sister and he admitted to pulling 
down the four year-old's underwear and looking at her genitals. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.2.) 
The four-year old told CARES personnel that no one has touched her "pee-pee" or her 
"butt." (PSI, 9/14/06: BPD Supplemental Report (Stephenson), 3/22/06). While 
perhaps not mitigating, the evidence showing that Mr. Pierce did nothing more than look 
at the child's genitals shows that the nature of the crime was certainly not severe. 
In exchange for nothing, Mr. Pierce agreed to plead guilty. (Tr., 8/1/06, p.1, L.l - 
p.2, L.25.) The State's only assurance was that they would take into account the results 
of any psychosexual evaluation and the information contained in the PSI but they were 
not bound to make any  recommendation^.^ (Tr., 8/1/06, p.1, L. l  - p.2, L.25.) The 
district court signed an order requiring Ada County to pay for Dr. John Morgan to 
conduct the psychosexual evaluation (R., pp.37-38); however, apparently based upon a 
proposed order submitted by the State (R., pp.42-43), the district court entered an Order 
Withdrawing Order for Evaluation by Dr. Morgan erroneously stating that the plea 
agreement required that an evaluation would be done by a SANE evaluator (R., pp.44- 
45.) Nevertheless, the State's chosen evaluator, Dr. Robert Engle, concluded that 
Mr. Pierce is a low risk to re-offend and is an appropriate candidate for outpatient sex 
offender treatment. (Psychosexual Eval, pp.9, 11 .) 
Mr. Pierce was 23 years old at the time of his original sentencing. (PSI, 9/14/06, 
p.1.) Mr. Pierce's biggest problem is his alcoholism. He started drinking around the 
age of 13 and as he got older he drank more and more. (PSI, 9/14/06, pp.13-14.) As 
early as age 16, Mr. Pierce was drinking every other day or so. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.13.) 
Mr. Pierce's father was also an alcoholic and on one occasion, Mr. Pierce heard his 
father choking his mother, he punched his father, and his father left. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.6.) 
The unintended consequence of his father leaving was that he then had the whole 
This appears to be a recitation of a prosecutor's responsibilities in any sentencing 
hearing. 
house to himself and could party whenever he wanted. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.6.) By the time 
he went to jail pending resolution of the charges, he was using so much alcohol that he 
suffered serious withdrawal symptoms. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) On the night of his crime, 
he drank "'a half bottle of Black Velvet Whiskey."' (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) Mr. Pierce has 
also used methamphetamine and marijuana in the past. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) 
Mr. Pierce's mother expressed her supporter for her son and noted that alcohol is his 
problem. (PSI, 9/14/06, pp.7-8.) Mr. Pierce recognized that he needed alcohol 
treatment and expressed a desire to partake in such treatment. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) 
Despite Dr. Engle's conclusions, during the sentencing hearing the State 
recommended that Mr. Pierce be sent to prison for a period of fifteen years, with two 
years fixed. (Tr., 10/25/06, p.20, L.22 - p.29, L.7.) Counsel for Mr. Pierce asked that 
he be placed on probation. (Tr., 10/25/06, p.39, Ls.74-17.) The district court imposed 
and executed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction so that Mr. Pierce could participate in a rider. (R., pp.51-54.) 
At the conclusion of his rider, the Department of Correction recommended that 
he be placed on probation. (APSI.) Mr. Pierce wrote a letter to the court indicated that 
his participation in the Sex Offender Assessment Group made him realize that his 
actions hurt M.B. and her family and he wished for a chance to make amends. (APSI: 
Letter from Mr. Pierce.) Despite the recommendations from the IDOC, the prosecutor 
recommended that the court relinquish jurisdiction because, in the prosecutor's mind, 
the DOC recommendation of probation was a "conclusion completely in error." (Tr., 
4/5/07, p.56, Ls.19-22.) The district court ultimately placed Mr. Pierce on probation for a 
period of fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.) 
Mr. Pierce admitted to violating his probation by failing to pay his supervision 
fees, failing to complete sex offender treatment and by frequenting places where minors 
or victims of choice congregate. (Tr., 12/13/07, p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.20.) Notably, he 
had not engaged in any criminal activity, had not consumed any alcohol or controlled 
substances, and most importantly, he had not re-offended. (See PSI, 1/25/08, p.2; 
Attachment, Report of Probation Violation.) In fact, Mr. Pierce completed a polygraph 
examination where he was asked if he had any sexual contact other than with the two 
adult women he admitted to having contact with (including the mother of one of his 
children), Mr. Pierce stated that he had not and the examiner noted that his reactions 
were consistent with truthfulness. (PSI, 1/25/08 Attachment, Confidential Polygraph 
Report.) 
During the disposition hearing, the State for the third time asked that Mr. Pierce 
be sent to prison. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, Ls.14-15.) Counsel for Mr. Pierce asked that he 
either be retained on probation or sent on a second rider. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, L.18 - 
p.91, L.2.) Counsel noted to the court that Mr. Pierce has the strong support of his 
family and that he because he took the Sex Offender Assessment Group while on his 
first rider, he did not take other programming that would address other areas of concern 
such as his thinking errors. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, L.18 - p.93, L.4.) The district court then 
revoked Mr. Pierce's probation and did not reduce his sentence. (R., pp.89-91.) 
Mr. Pierce is currently serving a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed, after he admitted to pulling down a four-year old girl's underwear when he was 
drunk. Already a low risk to re-offend, between the time he made that poor decision 
and the time the district court executed his sentence, he had learned how his actions 
had harmed the child and her family, had stopped drinking, and had not committed any 
new criminal offenses, specifically, he had not committed any new sex offenses. The 
ldaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a 
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 
103 ldaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). In Nice, the ldaho Supreme Court reduced a 
sentence based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not 
give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in 
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the 
problem." Id. at 91, 645 P.2d at 325. Furthermore, the ldaho Supreme Court has ruled 
that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate 
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 ldaho 
405,408,631 P.2d 187, 190 (1981). 
Additionally, Mr. Pierce has the strong support of his family members and friends. 
(PSI, p.6.) See State v. Shideler, 103 ldaho 593, 594-595, 651 P.2d 527, 528-29 (1982) 
(reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his 
rehabilitation efforts). He was 23 year old at the time of this offense and ldaho Courts 
recognize that the young age of a defendant should be taken into consideration as a 
mitigating factor. See State v. Dunnagan, 101 ldaho 125, 126, 609 P.2d 657, 658 
(1980). 
Considering the nature of the offense and character of the offender, the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to continue probation, send Mr. Pierce on a second 
rider, or reduce his sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pierce respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction due to the 
district court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, he respectfully requests 
that this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions that he be placed 
on probation or that the district court retain jurisdiction or otherwise reduce Mr. Pierce's 
sentence as this Court deems appropriate. 
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